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Abstract 
 
Economic experiments conducted in laboratories employing an induced-values 
methodology can report on allocative efficiencies observed.  This methodology is limited by 
requiring the experimenter to know subjects’ motivations, an impossibility in field 
experiments.  Allocative efficiency implies a hypothetical costless aftermarket would be 
inactive.  An outcome of an allocation mechanism is herein defined to be behaviorally efficient if 
an appropriate aftermarket is actually appended to the allocation mechanism and at most a 
negligible aggregate size of mutually beneficial gains is observed on the aftermarket.  
Methodological requirements for observation of behavioral efficiency or inefficiency are put 
forward.  A simple field demonstration indicates when an increase in public good output can 
cover marginal cost in a mutually beneficial decentralization, without knowing valuations.  
Several empirical issues that arise with the methodology are noted. 
C9; C93; D01; D61; D03; D46; Keywords:  behavioral efficiency, field experiment 
methodology, allocative efficiency, revelation of valuations, aftermarkets
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“My research agenda focuses on using field experiments to learn what social policies 
work, what do not, and why.”1 
       --Dean Karlan, Yale University 
 
  1. Introduction 
I begin by quoting Karlan, not as a straw horse, but as a definitive statement by a noted 
economist who has already contributed within this agenda.  The verb “work” in this quote 
admits a broad interpretation, including possibly impacts of a policy on median income, 
income inequality, income security, intergenerational mobility and related opportunities, 
economic growth, educational attainment, as well as narrower impacts on family size, labor 
force participation, and many others.  Whatever the list a particular researcher considers, to 
an economist an essential component of whether a policy “works” is how small or large a 
shortfall from allocative efficiency it attains. 
Efficiency measures are commonplace in economic laboratory experimentation.2  The 
restriction to laboratory experiments is critical, as the methodology allowing observations of 
the shortfall from allocative efficiency, induced values, can only be employed in a laboratory 
setting, and cannot help Karlan and other scholars observe “what social policies work … 
and why” in the field. 
In many hundreds of laboratory experiments, financially motivated subjects transact 
abstract commodities (perhaps called X or “triangle” but not “tennis lessons” or “Big 
Macs”) on markets observed by the experimenter.  Absent any innate values, valuations of X                                                         
1 Beginning text of his homepage, http://karlan.yale.edu/, visited 4/16/11. 
2 Cf. e.g., Smith [1962], [1976], Davis and Holt [1993], Kagel and Roth [1995], and original sources cited in the 
latter two works. 
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are induced by the experimenter, as “the first unit of X you buy can be resold to the 
experimenter for $8.75, the second for $6.80, the third for $5.10” to a potential buyer, or 
“the first unit of X you sell can be obtained from the experimenter for $3.10, etc.”  When 
transactions costs can be deemed negligible, inducing values allows the experimenter to 
calculate the set of Pareto efficient allocations, and attach a cardinal measurement to any 
observed shortfall from this set. 
No corresponding measure is available in field experiments, where transactions might 
involve (usually subsidized) provision and/or allocation of:  irrigation water, adult education, 
childcare, pollution permits, microfinance, insurance against background risk, or similar 
“naturally occurring” goods, services and contracts.  In “framed” field experiments, these 
transactions occur on a market constructed and controlled by the experimenter; in “natural” 
field experiments, the experimenter observes but cannot control a naturally occurring 
market.3  The experimenter can observe transacting behavior but not valuations or 
motivations, and so cannot calculate the Pareto set nor measure shortfalls from it. 
This paper proposes a definition and a specific but broadly usable methodology to allow 
observations relevant to allocative efficiency in field experiments, which observe only 
behaviors that stem from unobserved motivations and preferences (and sometimes even 
incompletely observed feasibility constraints).  Theoretical issues arising with this 
methodology are described.  Following that, I provide a first field demonstration, observing 
whether an increase in output of a public good from an ad hoc starting point can be 
achieved as a mutually beneficial reallocation.  Then several empirical issues that arise in the 
consideration of this methodology are discussed.  A companion paper offers a concrete 
demonstration of the methodology in the simplest possible environment—an economy with 
a single, indivisible good—and illustrates how laboratory- and field- compatible efficiency 
measures might be distinct. 
Among the finest examples of how far field experiments have been able to go in the 
direction of inferring efficiency conclusions from observations is Bohm [1984].  Peter Bohm 
convinced the Swedish federal government to let him control whether an indivisible public 
good would be produced or not, an office that would collect and provide certain statistical 
data to local governments. Randomly splitting the local governments into two groups, he 
announced rules to one group that gave them an incentive to understate willingness-to-pay 
(WTP), and to the other an incentive to overstate WTP.  The observed sum of stated WTPs 
slightly exceeded cost, and mean WTP per capita was not markedly different between the 
two groups.  Nothing Bohm could observe, however, would let him infer whether providing 
the statistical office would yield an efficiency gain.  
Bohm believed the binary nature of the public good decision he studied was a large 
advantage: “The case of divisible public goods, requiring the revelation of WTP functions, or 
at least WTP for several alternative quantities, is referred to the science fiction department 
for the time being.” (pp. 138-9)  Over a quarter century later, the methodology proposed 
herein seeks to move beyond (or back from?) science fiction. 
                                                        
3 I am defining these terms slightly differently than Harrison and List [2004], as the issue of experimenter 
control seems more critical than whether subjects are aware they are in an experiment. 
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1.1. Pareto Efficiency Reinterpreted 
In an economy with I individuals and C commodities, let xi be the C-dimensional 
allocation to individual i, ui his utility function, and x = (x1, …, xI).  Then the usual definition 
of a Pareto-efficient allocation is that it satisfies 
    (P): Max x u1(x), subject to:  uj(x) ≥ uj, all j = 2,…, I, and to feasibility conditions. 
In the 1950’s it became commonplace among several developers of general equilibrium 
theory to add imagery in a reinterpretation of this maximization problem:  Suppose an 
allocation were to be Pareto-efficient.  Then a hypothetical costless aftermarket would be 
inactive, for the simple reason that, upon reaching a Pareto-efficient allocation, there would 
be no remaining mutually beneficial transactions to exploit. 
This reinterpretation is informationally dissimilar:  the maximization in (P) is clearly tied 
to knowledge of motivations and valuations (ui, after all), while the counterfactual 
aftermarket is tied to hypothetical transactions (that is, to hypothetical behaviors).  In 
principle, as transactions can be observed in field experiments, these experiments might avail 
themselves of aftermarkets.  
2. A Definition 
So I define behavioral efficiency: an outcome of an allocation mechanism is said to be 
behaviorally efficient if an appropriate (incentive-compatible, suitably transparent, and 
approximately costless) aftermarket is actually (and immediately) appended to the allocation 
mechanism4 and at most a negligible aggregate size of mutually beneficial gains is observed 
on the aftermarket. Natural extensions of the definition include at least the following:  [a] an 
allocation mechanism is said to be behaviorally efficient in a particular context if it reliably 
yields behaviorally efficient outcomes; [b] a social or economic policy Y is said to be 
behaviorally less inefficient in a particular context than an alternative policy Z if the shortfall 
from behaviorally efficient outcomes under policy Y is robustly observed in such 
aftermarkets to be significantly smaller than observed under Z.  
3. Aftermarket Methodology 
The aftermarket referred to in this definition must be designed and implemented so as to 
support the intended normative interpretation.  It likely aids first to set aside straightforward 
disqualifications:  [i] In general, simply repeating an allocation mechanism does not suffice to 
draw meaningful conclusions about efficiency of the initial application of the mechanism (an 
illustration is in section 4).5  [ii] Whatever its structure, a resale market (Zheng [2002]) does 
not suffice.  A key terminological distinction:  unlike resale markets (e.g., for US Treasury 
debt), an aftermarket necessarily involves the same economic actors as the original market 
(original allocation mechanism), none added and none absent.6  Imagine $100K in 5-year T-
notes is sold today, by their purchaser at a Treasury auction on the third Tuesday of the 
month before last, to a regional bank that did not compete in that particular Treasury 
auction. Today’s resale in no way implies an inefficiency in the allocation that resulted from                                                         
4 Any method, however informal, of reaching an allocation is herein labeled an allocation mechanism. 
5 Were repeating the same mechanism to suffice in some special circumstance, likely it would create needless 
confusion for subjects. 
6 This definition is clearly implied in the half-century-old reinterpretation of Pareto efficiency noted in section 
1.1 above. 
3
that auction. [iii] Later transactions involving an informationally distinct commodity cannot 
support interpretation of an earlier allocation as inefficient.  For example, suppose one of a 
group of competing used-car dealers obtains a particular car at an auction of cars whose 
leases have ended.  Some days after the auction, the consigner of this particular car agrees to 
allow the winning bidder to return the car and be given a full refund; that winning bidder 
continues to be considered a financially reliable bidder by the auctioneer.  Even if exactly the 
same set of bidders are competing when the car is re-auctioned, a different bidder winning 
the re-auction does not imply any inefficiency of the original auction.  The knowledge that 
the car was returned, inferred from the fact of its re-auction, leads to a realization that a 
quality issue unsuspected as of the original auction has since surfaced, thus to a different 
commodity being allocated at re-auction. 
To shed light on behavioral efficiency, the aftermarket must be constructed so as to 
identify any and all remaining mutually beneficial transactions involving the same set of 
traders, under the same information as occurs when the original market (or other 
mechanism) reaches an allocation.7  This requires revelation: that subjects’ behavior in the 
aftermarket can be interpreted as revealing the border between potential transactions they 
prefer to make and prefer not to make, thus as revealing all relevant willingnesses-to-pay and 
willingnesses-to-accept.8  In straightforward situations, this can be accomplished via a typical 
incentive-compatibility characterization:  that the price to any partner in any transaction be 
independent of his or her own behavior, with the impact of the behavior limited to affecting 
whether (to be precise, the probability with which) an aftermarket transaction occurs.  As 
formalized below, the aftermarket should be designed in such a way that a posited 
equilibrium behavior in the original allocation mechanism, together with truthful revelation 
in the aftermarket, constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the mechanism-cum-
aftermarket game. 
If the aftermarket had to be an allocation mechanism in its own right, this revelation 
requirement would typically be impossible (Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983] provide an 
impossibility theorem for perhaps the simplest case).  However, the aftermarket is to be 
appended to a lab or field experiment, not to determine an allocation but merely to 
normatively categorize the allocation reached before the aftermarket is used.  The 
simplification thus obtained is characterized in section 4.  
This bears emphasis:  for the purpose of behavioral efficiency interpretation, an 
aftermarket does not have to be an allocation mechanism. 
That the aftermarket be approximately free of transactions costs, and that it be suitably 
transparent, necessarily have less exacting interpretations; these are arenas where 
employment of aftermarkets shifts from science, narrowly construed, in the direction of art.                                                          
7 I follow a century-old tradition in welfare economics that externalities to a transaction are either explicitly 
modeled or ignored.  Thus, if allocations A and B differ only in that in A, a cocktail dress remains in company 
C’s inventory, while in B, Ginger buys the dress from company C at a mutually beneficial price, then allocation 
B is considered Pareto-superior to A.  This ignores the possibility that Ginger might later attend a party where 
seeing the new dress makes Rosemary less happy with her wardrobe.  In contrast, where a field study is focused 
on externalities, the aftermarket must observe all possible disutilities resulting from recontracting, not just the 
transactors’ evaluations. 
8 I know of only two antecedent reports of experiments employing aftermarkets, Grether, Isaac and Plott 
[1979, 1989] and Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin [1982].  Both experiments are fine laboratory studies of airport 
landing rights; in neither is the aftermarket designed to identify all possible remaining gains from trade, and in 
both the induced values are utilized to analyze original and post-aftermarket efficiency. 
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Negligibility of transactions costs is most usefully evaluated relative to the size of potential 
mutual gains from further transacting.  Indeed, transactions costs yield a calibration:  an 
appropriate aftermarket identifies all mutually beneficial transactions for which the perceived 
gains from trade exceed the perceived transactions costs.   
When subjects have already been congregated, either physically or via simultaneous 
interaction on the Internet, an aftermarket run fairly quickly and with simple, transparent 
tasks for subjects is likely to sluff off transactions-costs concerns.  When congregating is 
only required for the aftermarket, it may be that an appropriate aftermarket design 
compensates subjects for the costs of congregating, being careful to compensate in a manner 
unrelated to observed aftermarket activity.9   
Experimental psychology and laboratory experimental economic literatures yield insights 
into transparency that are extensive, although often anecdotal and always subjective.10 
3.1. Required Nature of Potential Aftermarket Transactions 
A useful aftermarket needs to observe behavior with respect to any potential transaction 
that may be mutually beneficial; this need will vary with the topics of field studies.  When 
allocation of identical units of a single private good is the concern (or when identical units of 
multiple goods are at stake, but issues of complementarities or income effects can reasonably 
be assumed absent), observations of behavioral valuations of bilateral trades suffice.  When 
goods L and R are complements for some subjects, the possibility that subject 1 might value 
an additional set {L, R} by an amount sufficient to compensate both subject 2 for forgoing 
one unit of L and subject 3 for forgoing one unit of R must be observable by design.   
Another important example arises when the original allocation mechanism determines a 
quantity of a public good to be produced, and an allocation of its production cost.  Now an 
aftermarket merely observing potential bilateral transactions is insufficient; transactions 
which alter public good output and attain some adjustment of cost shares in accordance with 
increased or reduced public good production cost must be considered, as seen in section 5.  
Some field studies will require the aftermarket be designed so as to observe valuations of 
dynamically structured contracts.  Allocations of common-pool resources are examples. 
The usual characterization of efficiency via (P) above determines marginal conditions and 
assumes the appropriate convexities to imply that a local optimum is a global optimum.  A 
similar limitation may be needed in many cases to keep aftermarkets sufficiently simple and 
straightforward.  For example, consider examining in an aftermarket both an increase and a 
decrease in public good output, each by some more-than-differential amount that is in 
context small. Concluding a behaviorally efficient outcome from an observed inability to 
find any mutually beneficial increase or decrease by that given amount assumes the 
unobserved motivations were consistent with marginal valuations decreasing more rapidly 
than marginal production cost.  Should a behavioral inefficiency be found, the study would                                                         
9 It is important that an aftermarket be constructed so that a subject engages observable behaviors whatever 
degree of satisfaction they have with the original allocation, so as to avoid “active participation hypothesis” 
concerns (Lei, Noussair and Plott [2001]). 
10 That price-clock-based ascending-price mechanisms are notably more transparent than sealed-bid 
mechanisms seems a reasonable inference to draw from the laboratory experiments reported in Harstad [2000].  
For this reason, such ascending-price mechanisms are used both in section 5’s demonstration and in the 
companion paper. 
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indicate in which direction public good output could be altered so as to obtain a perceived 
mutual gain, but not how far such a movement could continue.  In most contexts, the 
imaginable alternative of checking several possible increases in public-good output of 
varying sizes, and corresponding decreases, is likely to rob an aftermarket of a required low-
transaction-costs character.11 
 4. Theoretical Issues Raised 
Suppose the allocation mechanism being studied is sufficiently formal to permit analysis 
as a game G.12  Let G denote the game consisting of G followed by the aftermarket G+ that 
is being constructed to test behavioral efficiency of G.  Then the aftermarket must be 
constructed so that E = {E, E+} is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of G, where E is the 
equilibrium usually focal in literature considering G, and E+ constitutes truthful revelation in 
G+.  Otherwise, a behavioral efficiency (or inefficiency) conclusion is unwarranted. 
Aftermarket construction can thus be viewed as a particular type of mechanism design 
problem.  While formal constraints of mechanism design are often limiting, the mechanism 
design challenge posed here should always be attainable.  An aftermarket constructor has 
two critical dimensions of flexibility generally unavailable in mechanism design:  the field 
experiment [a] does not have to balance the budget, though hopefully limiting the size of any 
deficit; [b] does not have to implement any transactions observed to be mutually beneficial 
with probability one, but merely with positive probability.13 
As a simple illustration, suppose a field experiment has observed a failure to reach an 
agreeable transaction in a bilateral bargaining situation.  As motivations are unobserved, it is 
unknown whether a mutually beneficial bargain was possible.  Myerson and Satterthwaite 
[1983] demonstrate that no mechanism can insure efficient outcomes when the potential 
seller’s and potential buyer’s valuations are private information.  However, at least three 
distinct aftermarket constructions can observe whether the outcome was behaviorally 
efficient.14  Each asks the seller to state the lowest price that he is willing to accept, and the 
buyer to state the highest price that she is willing to pay.15  The experimenter has carefully 
explained in advance to the subjects what use will be made of their responses.  Aftermarket 
version 1 will implement the transaction whenever B, her stated willingness-to-pay, exceeds 
A, his stated willingness-to-accept, with the pre-announced rule that she will pay A, and he                                                         
11 Correspondingly, suppose an aftermarket appended to a mechanism allocating a given quantity of identical 
units of a private good were to observe that the potential buyer willing to pay the most for an additional unit 
could not cover the lowest price at which some potential seller was willing to provide the additional unit.  
Assuming that there was no mutually beneficial trade in which this buyer would acquire two units of the good 
(thus, assuming unobserved motivations included diminishing marginal utility) might be preferable to running 
an aftermarket that priced 2-unit (and perhaps 3-unit) trades as well as 1-unit trades, and allowed for multiunit 
trades to have multiple parties on the same side of the trade. 
12 This supposition is not trivial:  some of the cultural incentive schemes discussed in Ostrom [1998] may be 
difficult to formalize as allocation mechanisms. 
13 It may be worth noting that, where the implementation is financial, this implies a positive probability that the 
commitments made are financially incurred.  I see no opportunity for surveys about whether subjects wished to 
reallocate, or about hypothetical terms under which subjects wished to reallocate, to substitute for an 
aftermarket. 
14 If the failure to reach a transaction occurred in a natural field experiment, the aftermarket would require a 
transition to a framed field experiment. 
15 Depending on context and the background and culture of the subjects, this may well not be the language in 
which the experimental instructions state the request. 
6
will receive B. Version 1 is incentive-compatible, implements any transaction observed to be 
mutually beneficial, and requires the experimenter to cover the deficit B – A.  Aftermarket 
version 2 draws a random variable R from a distribution exogenous to all information 
provided by this pair of subjects (perhaps uniform on [0.25 W, 1.75 W], where W is a 
publicly available average price from a prior survey of similar transactions in the economy), 
and transacts at random price R if B ≥ R ≥ A.  Aftermarket version 2 is incentive-
compatible, implements any transaction observed to be mutually beneficial with positive 
probability, and balances the budget. Aftermarket version 3 also draws a random variable R 
from an exogenous distribution, transacts if B ≥ R ≥ A, but she pays R and he receives 1.05 
R, achieving incentive compatibility, implementing transactions observed to be mutually 
beneficial with positive probability, but requiring the experimenter cover a deficit of 0.05 R 
when transactions occur.   
Note that mechanism design requirements can still impinge on experimental desiderata.  
In particular, consider an aftermarket construction which attempted to alter aftermarket 1 
above by only transacting when the deficit B – A did not exceed a maximum desired 
experimenter cash infusion M.  This construction would no longer suffice for incentive 
compatibility:  it is possible that the seller would attain the outcome of no transaction and no 
gain if he truthfully stated A, as B – A might exceed M, while some overstatement X ≥ A 
might yield a gain of B – X > 0 should B – X be less than M.  Thus, instead of an incentive 
to truthfully reveal his willingness-to-accept, the seller (and the buyer) would optimally trade 
off a lower gain in the event of transaction against a higher probability of a gain by some 
degree of overstatement.  (Even if, instead of announcing M, the experimenter merely stated 
that the transaction would occur “unless the deficit were too large,” the construction would 
still be insufficient to warrant conclusions as to behavioral efficiency.)  
 5. A Small Field Demonstration 
5.1. FIELD CONTEXT:  To focus the demonstration on the aftermarket, the initial 
allocation mechanism is submersed via an assumption that the outcome is production of one 
unit of public good, with the costs of the first unit’s production covered from the 
experimenter’s budget.  The aftermarket then considers whether the cost of production of a 
second unit can be allocated to the perceived mutual benefit of all members of the economy.  
The aftermarket’s construction does not balance the budget, allowing the experimenter to 
cover a deficit if it is observed that the sum of marginal benefits exceeds production cost of 
the second unit. 
The public good studied is a uniform distribution of small packets of Haribo candy, a 
product in international distribution and prominent on the shelves of local grocery and 
convenience stores.  It is natural to think of candy as a private good, but in this experiment it 
was allocated under strict adherence to the definition of a pure public good.  That is, [a] 
there was group exclusion but no individual exclusion in consumption, and [b] there was no 
rivalry in consumption.  Either all subjects received one unit of candy apiece, or all subjects 
received two units of candy apiece, depending on whether stated willingnesses-to-pay 
summed to at least the production cost. 
All groups studied consisted of six subjects.  Eighteen subjects (in one session, twelve, 
due to no-shows) were in the room during a session, so that no subject knew which others 
were in the same group.  Subjects were students recruited by website signup from several 
campuses of the University of Montpellier.  Show-up fees ranged from €3-8, depending on 
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the distance from their home campus to the Experimental Economics Lab at the Richter 
campus. 
Subjects were seated at visually isolated computers.  Instructions were passed out and 
read aloud, questions encouraged and answered.16  The initial unit of Haribo candy was given 
to each subject; they were allowed to consume it immediately if they were uncertain of the 
quality of the candy or for any other reason.  They were informed that a second unit would 
be provided to every member of the group if the sum of the most each group member was 
willing to pay was at least €1.17 These were elicited, the second unit provided or not, and 
subjects paid to the experimenter their cost share for the additional unit (which was 
necessarily less than the show-up fee). 
5.2. METHODOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION:  As mentioned, the allocation of 1 unit of public 
good is treated as if it arose via some allocation mechanism, with the experiment observing 
an aftermarket.  A “clock” ticked up on subjects’ computer screens, increasing by 2 euro 
cents, initially every 4 seconds, after 8 euro cents, increasing every 2 seconds.  Subjects were 
asked simply to watch the clock so long as the price was one which they were willing to pay 
in order to have the group increase public good output from one unit to two, and then to 
click on the “Accept” button on the screen as soon as the next tick of the clock would yield 
a price that they were not willing to pay in return for the increase to two units.18 
Before the clock was run, the outcome function was carefully explained to subjects.  If 
the sum of the six “Accept” prices was at least €1, each subject in the group would be given 
a second unit of candy, and each subject would pay €1 minus the sum of the other five 
Accept prices (or 0, whichever was larger).  
This methodology implements the incremental version of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
mechanism.19  If a subject is certain of the amount of euros which he would be willing to pay 
to have the public good output increased from one to two, then it is a dominant strategy to 
click on the Accept button at the multiple of 2 euro cents nearest his willingness-to-pay.  
Harstad [2000] has found the price-clock mechanism to be far more transparent than direct 
statement of willingness-to-pay in eliciting dominant strategy responses. 
The incentive compatibility of this methodology warrants the conclusion that the group 
exhibits a behavioral inefficiency of the allocation—of one  candy each—if the sum of 
Accept prices exceeds €1. 
5.3. OBSERVATIONS:  Thirteen of twenty-three groups exhibited a perceived mutual gain 
in increasing the distribution of candy from one unit to two units apiece.  (This included six 
of the eleven groups that chose well before lunchtime, and seven of the twelve groups that 
chose shortly after 1:30 [or three after 3:30 pm], so there is no sign that chronobiology 
played a role.)  The size of behaviorally revealed efficiency gains in these groups ranged from 
4% to 72% of production cost (€1), averaging 33%.                                                         
16 An English-language version of the instructions is available at http://harstad.missouri.edu/Instructs/. 
17 Haribo candy was of course available for purchase outside the lab, and a subject’s transactions costs of doing 
so were unknown.  Hence, it was important to keep the per-capita threshold for public good production below 
extra-laboratory prices, so that censoring stated valuations by extra-laboratory availability could not be an issue; 
cf. Harrison, Harstad and Rutstrom [2004]. 
18 The experiment was conducted in the Z-Tree programming environment (Fischbacher [2007]). 
19 Named for Vickrey [1961], Clarke [1971] and Groves [1973]. 
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The other ten groups found one unit of public good to be behaviorally efficient relative 
to the sole alternative of two units.  The sums of Accept prices in these groups ranged from 
56% to 98% of production cost, averaging 86%. 
In none of the thirteen groups accomplishing the behavioral efficiency improvement 
could public good production cost have been covered by a mutually acceptable uniform tax.  
Rather, only through person-specific pricing could the public good increment be mutually 
beneficial.  Of course, acceptable person-specific price vectors (not uniquely determined in 
any of the thirteen groups) could not have been known by the experimenter, but were 
revealed by behavior in the aftermarket (and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves selection among 
those vectors actually used for payment). 
The highest stated willingness-to-pay was €0.54; eighteen of 138 subjects chose an Accept 
price of €0.04 or less, another forty-five €0.16 or less. 
Though there is evidence that it was transparent, it is of course not known whether 
subjects adopted the dominant strategy of revealing their willingnesses-to-pay. Instructions 
made it clear that subjects were to evaluate not a second unit of Haribo candy for their own 
consumption, but a second unit of public good production.  Nonetheless, it is unknown 
whether any subject selfishly placed the same value on second units for all group members as 
on a private purchase of a second unit.  Nor is it known whether any subjects were behaving 
altruistically, or the extent of any altruistic behavior.  It is no more necessary to know their 
motivations than it would be necessary to know why a consumer purchased a shirt in order 
to evaluate the allocative efficiency of a shirt market.  This aspect justifies treating a 
laboratory setting as a simple field experiment. 
Although the setting was simple almost to the point of contrivance, and the stakes 
miniscule, this demonstration finds that, at least in the case of public good allocation, the 
concept can be taken to the field.  Whether an adjustment in public good output can be 
accomplished—via a mutually beneficial decentralization of adjustment costs—can be 
inferred from observations solely of behavior, provided the aftermarket used to observe 
those behaviors is appropriately designed.  Larger scale, more important field studies can 
exactly mimic the demonstration offered here, and relate behavioral efficiency observations 
to the methods used to determine levels of public good output. 
5.4. LABORATORY OBSERVATION ON STRATEGIC TRANSPARENCY:  Following the 
demonstration, since the subjects were in an experimental laboratory, a simple induced-value 
laboratory phase was added.  Subjects were given instructions about the allocation of an 
abstract public good.  The only value of this public good was monetary utility to each 
individual subject that had been specified by the experimenter.20 
To mimic the field demonstration, an ad hoc mechanism that was suppressed set initial 
public good output to 7 units, and each group was asked whether to increase output to 8 
units, at an incremental production cost of €3.  Each subject was privately told the 
incremental value vj to her or him of the increase from 7 to 8 units; the distribution of these 
incremental values was not announced, although it was announced that the incremental 
values were not all the same.  These six values summed to less than the incremental cost (a 
random decision, as was the 7-unit starting point); one randomly chosen subject had an 
incremental valuation equal to  €0.7, one equal to €0.06, four equal to €0.42 (that four had                                                         
20 This assumes selfish preferences, a limitation the field experiment does not share. 
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the same incremental value was not known to the subjects until results were reported).  
Division of subjects into groups was via a new random draw, independent of the draw in the 
field experiment; this feature was announced. 
In all other respects, the induced-value procedure was identical to that of the field 
demonstration:  a clock ticked up on all screens (by a multiple of €0.05), subjects were asked 
to click “Accept” at the highest price they were willing to pay to increase public good output 
from 7 to 8 units (their incremental value was shown on the screen as the price ticked up), 
and were told beforehand that an individual group member’s personal cost of this increase, 
which would happen if and only if the sum of Accept prices were at least the production 
cost, would be the €3 production cost less the sum of the Accept prices of the other five 
group members.  It was carefully explained that their payoff for this decision would be zero 
if the amount of public good were not changed, and would be their incremental value less 
the excess of production cost over the sum of the other five Accept prices if public good 
output were increased.21 
As before, it is a dominant strategy to set one’s Accept price equal to the multiple of 
€0.05 closest to one’s incremental value.  Only with incremental values induced (thus in the 
lab, not the field), is it possible to see whether subjects did this.  Most did not exactly hit this 
dominant strategy, although on average the statistic Z = (Accept price – incremental value) 
was €0.00103, remarkably close to the €0.015 average it would have been had every subject 
exactly adopted the dominant strategy.22  The standard error of Z was nonnegligible, €0.298; 
the 23 subjects for whom vj = €0.06 had to click on Accept immediately (at €0.05) were 
clicking later than this, and averaged Z = €0.38.  This was compensated for by the 23 
subjects for whom vj = €0.7, perhaps not waiting for the price clock to reach that high; they 
averaged Z = –€0.32.  Still, over 80% of 138 subjects were within €0.3 of Z = 0, nearly half 
of those within €0.1.  For all twenty-three groups, the six Accept prices summed to less than 
the €3 production cost, so for all groups, seven units of public good was behaviorally 
efficient relative to the alternative of eight units.  Evidence in the induced-value setting for 
inexperienced subjects to be unable to understand the incentives they faced in the field 
demonstration is unpersuasive, indeed quite limited. 
 6. Remarks on Some of the Empirical Issues That May Arise 
If there is a limit to the empirical questions that arise with behavioral efficiency, I haven’t 
grasped it.  Here’s a sampling of those that are clear now. 
Are Pareto-efficient allocations and behaviorally efficient outcomes necessarily 
distinct?  Under the assumptions of the theory, the second paper in this series takes 
advantage of induced values to answer in the affirmative, finding a significant minority of 
observations that are either of these, but not the other.  One side arises when the subject 
with the highest privately observed estimate of asset value wins the auction (as would occur 
in the symmetric, risk-neutral Bayesian equilibrium), thus attaining a Pareto efficient 
allocation, but nonetheless a mutual gain in the aftermarket is observed.  The inverse also                                                         
21 The sessions followed these observations with pilot experiments studying public-good allocation mechanisms 
that did not bear on the issues of this paper. 
22 Because the Accept bid had to be a multiple of €0.05, in each group the one subject with incremental 
valuation €0.06 had a dominant strategy Z = 0.01, and the four subjects with incremental valuation €0.42 had a 
dominant strategy Z = 0.02. 
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arises when the auction winner is not the subject with the highest private information, but 
the aftermarket observes behavioral efficiency. 
How large are the magnitudes of shortfalls from behavioral efficiency, and how 
might these be assessed?  In each circumstance where I have been able to envision the 
outlines of an appropriate aftermarket design, any potential transaction perceived to be 
mutually beneficial that is observed provides an absolute magnitude of the perceived gain.  
To put this in percentage terms, as a shortfall from efficiency, requires being able to calculate 
the Pareto set.  In field studies, the best hope is to observe behaviors in the original 
allocation that indicate the potential size of efficiency gains.  The companion paper on 
auctions provides a treatment where such a comparison has a solid theoretical basis, and 
another with less foundation.  
Does knowing that an aftermarket will follow an allocation mechanism affect 
subjects’ behavior in the mechanism?  A requirement for aftermarket design is that there 
is in theory no effect.  This will be a potentially important question in every field context, and 
I expect to have to assess it de novo, at least until a large database of field aftermarkets has 
been compiled.  It is possible to design demonstrations and adapt data analysis to shed some 
light on this.  It would be possible in most field settings to surprise subjects with an 
aftermarket that they almost surely did not anticipate; this will not always be best practice. 
Will an aftermarket observe activity just because subjects assume they are 
supposed to do something?  This question arose, for good reason, in reports of 
experiments observing financial bubbles in labs (Smith, Suchanek and Williams [1988]). The 
particular “active participation hypothesis” raised by Lei, Noussair and Plott [2001] (that 
subjects engage in irrational activity because the experimental setup limited rational behavior 
to inactivity) need not be a concern here, however.  In aftermarkets, the anticipated designs 
will always have subjects do something, in essence engage in valuation activities. Even if the 
initial allocation might have been Pareto efficient, there will be a financial incentive to 
engage in the valuation activities.  It should always be possible to structure them so that a 
zero valuation behavior has nothing to do with a preference for the status quo that was 
reached in the original allocation mechanism. 
Are aftermarket activities mistakes if the initial allocation reached should have 
been Pareto-efficient?  In ordinary cases, it will be difficult if not impossible to label 
particular aftermarket behaviors mistakes.  Only when conducted in induced-values 
demonstrations will it be possible to determine whether the original allocation reached prior 
to the aftermarket was in fact Pareto efficient, and even then usually only under assumptions 
that may well be unverifiable.  For example, the Pareto efficiency characterization of the 
original allocation may be obtainable only under assumptions such as equilibrium behavior, 
risk neutrality, symmetric behavior, common knowledge of distributions of private 
information, selfish preferences, and others.  In some situations, there may be serious 
questions about whether the aftermarket design was sufficiently transparent for the subject 
population, as for example when the subjects are illiterate.  When transparency is adequate, I 
regard it as likely that aftermarket behaviors should be taken at face value. 
Might behavioral efficiency determination depend on the structure of the 
aftermarket used for observation and identification?  This will ever be an empirical 
possibility.  When field budgets and subject population sizes permit, multiple aftermarket 
designs can be tested. 
11
Might endowment effects lead to an inactive aftermarket even though the initial 
allocation was efficient?  This could be imagined, although it is hard to say that 
inefficiencies exist, let alone identify and quantify them, when an appropriately constructed 
aftermarket observes inactivity.  Plott and Zeiler [2005], [2007] demonstrate that the size of 
an endowment effect might almost be calibrable.  Careful instructions (avoiding the term 
“winning bidder”) in the companion paper on auction aftermarkets provide data strongly 
suggesting that the endowment effect is not a problem in that particular context. 
Might other studied psychological biases and behavioral anomalies affect 
aftermarket observations?  To a first approximation, an “anomaly” such as other-regarding 
preferences or hyperbolic discounting may equally impact both an original allocation 
mechanism and its aftermarket.  For many such concerns, there is no reason to believe that 
they suddenly arise in aftermarkets following an allocation mechanism that went untouched 
by them.  When there is evidence that some particular bias perceived to be relevant to a 
particular field study can reliably be redressed via education, it may well be best practice to 
educate first, then run the allocation mechanism followed by the aftermarket.  There is 
considerable evidence suggesting persistence of some biases in the presence of education.  
Since it is only behaviors that can be observed in field settings, observing aftermarket activity 
in the presence of such biases may well be the most appropriate way to provide advice for 
policies that will be promulgated for the population being studied. 
 6. Concluding Remarks on the Meaning(s) of Behavioral Efficiency  
It is a luxury of a parsimonious theory that economists who might disagree about the role 
of Pareto efficiency—how important is, or perhaps even whether it is desirable—
nonetheless agree on the definition of the term and its meaning.  I do not see how the 
terminology of empirical, behavioral studies can have the same luxury.   Thus, even if the 
definition of behavioral efficiency offered here becomes widely accepted, it seems naïve to 
hope that its meaning will achieve any universal interpretation. 
A perhaps less naïve hope is the following.  Suppose, starkly, that policy Y is observed in 
a particular context (including a particular subject population and their characteristics) to 
robustly yield behaviorally efficient outcomes, while alternative policy Z in the same context 
robustly yields outcomes with significantly large shortfalls from behavioral efficiency.  Then 
it might be widely agreed that, at whatever levels of sophistication underlie their perceptions 
and whatever level of transparency the aftermarket offers, subjects perceive mutual gains 
from trade that policy Z does not capture while perceiving no uncaptured mutual gains from 
trade following implementation of policy Y.  Indeed, it might even be widely accepted that 
advice to policymakers reporting and influenced by this finding could be an improvement 
over advice reporting and influenced by field experiments that obtain no observations about 
allocative efficiency.  Less starkly, when the observed size of shortfalls from behaviorally 
efficient outcomes are in context robustly smaller for policy Y than for policy Z, this might 
also come to be accepted to play a role in policy advice despite divergent opinions as to its 
exact meaning. 
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